I don't think Professor Inbau would deny that he is "prosecution minded," but surely more of his teaching brethren are "defense minded." If he finds it difficult to set aside the question of the guilt or innocence of a particular individual and focus solely upon the procedural and constitutional features of the case, others sometimes find it difficult to take into account considerations of police efficiency and public security. If he dwells too long heads of the Justices of the Supreme Court during the first century of its existence," see McGowan, The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System: The Problem in Historical Perspective, 33 Nont DMmE LAw. 527, 532-43 (1958 on the "needs" of the policeman-virtually to the exclusion of all other values and policies-others sometimes forget that constitutional guarantees "ought not to be an obstacle in a game but only a protection against arbitrary and capricious police action," that "if the rules make sense in the light of a policeman's task, we will be in a stronger position to insist that he obey them."' Professor Inbau's law enforcement background and police-prosecution perspective were put to good use in his famous 1948 article, "The Confession Dilemma in the Supreme Court.
' 2 It has deservedly been called an "important" contribution to the literature.
3 But 1948 was a long time ago--in this business.
Then the McNabb rule looked as if it might be tottering; it has since been twice reaffirmed. 4 By then, the Court had already banned "dry run" hangings, beatings, and other crude practices on the part of state officers, but as torture and terror became outmoded and were displaced by more subtle interrogation pressures, the area was marked by uncertainty. There is little uncertainty now; for a number of recent state confession cases has seen a vigilant Court outlaw much "psychological coercion," as well as physical violence.
5
Back in 1948, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that the security of one's privacy against unreasonable search and seizure was binding on the states through the due process clause; 6 it has since held that not only are these guarantees applicable to the states but that they must be enforced against them by means of the same sanction used against the federal government--exclusion of the illegally seized evidence. 7 If more examples of the imposition of national standards on state criminal proceedings are needed, in certain situations the states are now required to furnish all indigent prisoners with a free trial transcript or an adequate substitute."
Today, the course of the Court is clear. Once concerned with property rights much more than human liberty, "it is now the keeper, not of the nation's property, but of its conscience. ' 9 Whether or not this was always so, in the past decade a majority of the Court has heeded the warning that "federalism should not be raised to the plane of an absolute, nor the Bill of Rights ... reduced to a precatory trust."' 1 0 More and more, the Court has come to realize that to the peoples of the world "the criminal procedure sanctioned by any of our states is the procedure sanctioned by the United States."" Surely and steadily, "the national ideal is prevailing over state orientation. ' 2 In the meantime, how has Professor Inbau reacted to all this? I regret to say that his voice has grown louder and harsher. This is understandable, if not excusable. It has always been easier for winners to be more gracious than losers. And Inbau must have realized some time ago that he is taking a "somewhat lonely position, ' "" that he is fighting a losing -if not a lost-cause. Convinced that a major factor accounting for the stream of decisions against his views is "the neglect or failure of the police and prosecution to present adequately...
[their] side of the issue,"' 4 and evidently determined to remedy the matter, it is not too surprising that Professor Inbau has mistaken intemperateness for articulateness.
CRITICIZING THE COURT
Of course, I find nothing unprofessional or unlawyerlike in anybody's criticism of the Court for having overruled Wolf v. Colorado."s How could I? I was one of the many who criticized the Court for not overruling the Wolf case. 16 But criticism comes in different sizes and varieties.
It is one thing to differ with the Court about what the law is or ought to be; it is quite another to say what the law is. The court needs and welcomes criticism possessing "that quality of judiciousness which is demanded of the Court itself"; 7 the profession and the public can get along quite nicely without the kind that "fans the fires of lawlessness and cynicism... ignited in the wake of the school desegregation cases,"' 8 and without the kind that "offers comfort to anyone who claims legitimacy in defiance of the courts."' 9 I leave it to the reader to label Professor Inbau's brand of criticism. Here are some samples:
"We are not only neglecting to take adequate measures against the criminal element; we are actually facilitating their activities in the form of what I wish to refer to as 'turn 'em loose' court decisions and legislation. To be sure, such decisions and legislation are not avowedly for the purpose of lending aid and comfort to the criminal element, but the effect is the same....
" S. 329, 329-30 (1962) .
2 An argument disposed of in Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 193, 199 (1952 28-31 (1961) .
As an astute commentator has recently observed, "in most instances the [state] courts have not even discussed whether in-custody investigation by the police is legal"; they "have not needed to mark out the boundaries of proper police conduct short of that extreme characterized as coercion." Barrett, Police Practices and the Law--From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CATAE. L. Rxv. 11, 22 (1962) . This article, unfortunately not yet in print when I wrote my first "reply" to Professor Inbau, is an extraordinarily thoughtful, careful, and dispassionate treatment of a very explosive subject.
3 See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 20, at 88-89.
root idea of the Constitution" has been said to be "that man can be free because the state is not.
34
The next time he feels the urge to protest that the Court has gone beyond its constitutionally authorized functions he should consider the post-Baker v. Carr 35 remarks of the U. S. Attorney General: "When people criticize the courts for invading spheres of action which supposedly belong to other parts of our constitutional system, they often overlook the fact that the courts must act precisely because the other organs of government have failed to fulfill their own responsibilities. June 17, 1962, pp. 7, 38 . "I Schaefer, supra note 13, at 6. (Emphasis added.) The author also points out, id. at 4, that "we problems which are vital today were not presented to the Court until recently," e.g., the right to counsel in 1932, the admissibility of a coerced confession in 1936. He observes, too, that "the lateness of these decisions cannot be explained on the theory that the Court was originally reluctant to decide such cases. Apparently the question simply did not reach the Court." Ibid.
"I In a footnote supporting his criticism of Mapp v. Ohio, Professor Inbau assures us, Inbau, supra note 24, at 330n.6: "In this connection, I should also like to point out that when I say that the Supreme Court has no right to police the police, I have some company in the person of Mr. Justice Harlan. See his dissent in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956) ." I submit that the reference to Justice Harlan "in this connection" is, at the very least, misleading. Rea was an extraordinary case which found a majority of the Court voting to enjoin a federal agent from giving, in a state prosecution, evidence which he had obtained in the course of an illegal federal search. Justice Harlan voiced doubts that "the federal courts share with the executive branch of the Government responsibility for [Vol. 53 I prefer to call it enforcing the Constitution. Of course, here as elsewhere, the question of the Court's power and responsibility cannot be resolved by "little more than a play upon words."" Whatever one calls it, I think judicial intervention in these troublesome areas is more justifiable, more appropriate, than in most other fields. For here "the Court has put its emphasis on procedure, on due process in the primary meaning of the concept, for which the judiciary has special competence and responsibility. '40 A close student of the man and his work has observed that a main characteristic of Justice Brandeis was "an insistence on jurisdictional and procedural observances" and a "respect for the spheres of competence of other organs of authority." Court has the power or the responsibility to "police the police" would do well to consider the reasons advanced for Brandeis's activism in Olmstead:
"In this case the responsibility of the Court was inescapable. The issue involved the basic processes of government as they impinge on the individual against whom the forces of the law are brought to bear... [Tlhe processes of the criminal law had been applied to the individual, and no agency of government more appropriate than the Court could be expected to resolve the contest between public power and personal immunity." ' 4 In his "reply," Professor Inbau once again comes out bravely for better police selection and training and more pay. As the author of the Cahan opinion recently observed, the exclusionary rule has not "engendered the problems" about lawful and unlawful police conduct in search and seizure, but merely "tardily excavated them from the oubliettes where lie the stifled problems of the law. So long as illegally ,obtained evidence remained admissible in many states there was little motivation for full-scale inquiry. I can see how improvements in police selection, training, leadership and tradition would strengthen the case for judicial review. Court opinions are more likely to be "wasted" on indifferent, insensitive police departments; more apt to exert a constructive influence on good departments, more apt to stir thought and action when quality and training are high. But I fail to see how better pay, selection, and training would eliminate the need for judicial review.
As an astute commentator has observed: "Order is not to be exalted at the cost of liberty, and so even the best selected and best trained and best disciplined police forces must be subjected to incessant scrutiny, exacting criticism, and rigorous control.... It is quite true, of course, that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. But it is imperative to remember that the vigilance demanded by this maxim means vigilance against duly constituted authorityagainst the forces of order."
STARE DECISIS IN PARTICULAR AND "NEUTRAL

PRINCIPLES" IN GENERAL
In his "reply," Professor Inbau emphasizes that "all along the Court had considered the exclusionary rule to be only a rule of evidence; it did not evolve into a due process requirement until the 6 to 3 decision in 65 When he is unhappy about the way a case was decided, Inbau, it seems, does agree that after all "it is the Constitution which [a Supreme Court Justice] swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his precedessors may have put on it."" When he dislikes a particular precedent, Inbau, it seems, does recognize that a Justice formulating his view cannot do otherwise but "reject some earlier ones as false... unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him.' 67 In short, Professor Inbau's notion of stare decisis appears to run along these lines: It is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right (1) especially when you think it was "settled right," e.g., Wolf; (2) except when you think it was "settled wrong," e.g., -322 U. S. 143 (1944 McNabb, Ashcraft, Gouled. Of course, once the decision to invoke the principle of stare decisis turns on whether the case to be overruled "seems to hinder or advance the interests or values" you support, you no longer have a principle-it has been "reduced to a manipulative tool."'" Mapp and Wolf deal with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cases. This is hardly the battleground to make a brave stand for stare decisis. The Justice who told us that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,"' 9 also told us: "But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning. ... "70 I think the post-Wolf years contained some valuable lessons of experience.
For a long, long time opponents of the exclusionary rule have been telling us that the criminal should not go free merely because "the constable has blundered."' But this argument loses a good deal of its force when we are confronted with the Chief of Police-approved illegality that characterized the recent cases of Irvine v. Californian2 and "IT]he need for logical symmetry and consistency is a variable. In real property law and in many portions of commercial law, certainty and predictability are primary needs.... But on problems of public law, which at any given time are especially difficult, creating law that will benefit living people is far more important than that the law be settled. Therefore, on most matters of public law, being governed by the ideas of men long dead is unsatisfactory and may be even abominable."
7' E.g., Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) .
' 347 U. S. 128 (1954) . The Chief Justice and Justice Jackson took the position that a copy of the Irvine opinion-setting forth the "almost incredible" invasions of petitioner's privacy-should be sent to the United States Attorney General for his attention, id. at 138. The Attorney General did conduct an investigation, the results of which disclosed that "the police officers who placed the detectograph or microphone in Irvine's home were acting under orders of the Chief of Police, who in turn was acting with the full knowledge of the local District Attorney." Letter of Feb. 15, 1955 REv. 1182 REv. , 1195 REv. , 1197 REv. -98, 1201 REv. -02, 1205 REv. -06 (1952 .
If Illinois had adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule, criticism to the effect that the rule regards the "overzealous officer" or the "blundering constable" as a greater danger than the unpunished criminal would have been likely, but, until quite recently, most inappropriate. Until it came to the attention of the courts a short time ago, Chicago Police Department Rule No. 465 baldly asserted that the requirement of promptly bringing an arrestee before a judge or magistrate "does not apply when the offender is a well-known criminal who is held pending investigation." "Thus an officer of the executive branch-a policeman-was authorized by police regulations to perform a judicial function and decide whether the suspect was a 'good guy' and therefore should receive the benefits of the law, or he could decide the suspect was a 'bad guy' ... and make an exception and suspend the operation of the Constitution and laws of Illinois." Caldwell, Police
Efficiency in Lau, Enforcement as a Foundation of
American Life, 48 A.B.A.J. 130, 132-33 (1962) . Mr. Caldwell also notes that the former Police Commissioner of Chicago reportedly told the city council's committee investigating crime that his "policy has always been ... to pick up criminals, simply because they are criminals" even though "it may be illegal, and I have received some complaints from the civil liberties group." Id. at 132. Incidentally, the author of the aforementioned article, Arthur B. Caldwell, is not a "sensitive soul" (Professor Inbau's term for other law professors; see Kamisar, supra note 49, at 173 n. 20), but a former federal prosecutor for many years who is currently Chief of the Trial Staff of the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
such acts as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary duties for which the city employs and pays them. The reaction of Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police Department to the adoption of the exclusionary rule is, I think, typical and most illuminating:
"It now appears that the Court will approve the introduction of evidence seized without a warrant only when the officer bad probable cause.... Authority to search the person is apparently limited to the individual for whom there is probable cause.., and does not include companions that may be with him.
"The actual commission of a serious criminal offense will not justify affirmative police action until such time as the police have armed themselves with sufficient information to constitute 'probable cause'.... "As long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California, your police will respect it and operate to the best of their ability within the framework of limitations imposed by that rule."7 6 75 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 907, 911 (1955) . Judge Traynor, author of the Cahan opinion, had earlier written an opinion rejecting the exclusionary rule, People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P. 2d 44 (1942 [Vol. 53
Of course, the "framework of limitations" was imposed by the state and federal constitutional guarantees, not the exclusionary rule. Of course, so long as the state and federal constitutions were operative, a criminal offense never justified "affirmative police action" unless and -until there was "sufficient information to constitute 'probable cause.'" The police react to the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure had just been written! They talk as if and act as if the exclusionary rule were the guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure. Why shouldn't the courts? STATISTICS, TESTIMONY AND T=E FORcE OF "SIMPLE LOGIC"
In my earlier article in this Journal, I dwelt at considerable length on statistics and law enforcement testimony regarding the impact of rules of evidence on crime rates and police-prosecution efficiency. I did so in response to the charge that proponents of the exclusionary rules do not like to look at and talk about these "facts."
7 7 Consequently, as Professor Inbau has observed, my article turned out to be a good deal longer than his speech which brought it into being. Perhaps it was too long. For I must confess that when I read Professor Inbau's "reply" to me, I sometimes had the uncomfortable feeling that he hadn't quite read the whole article.
For example, I pointed out that three years after Mallory was handed down, United States Attorney Oliver Gasch reported "Mallory questions, that is to say, confessions or admissions, are of controlling importance in probably less than 5 % of our criminal prosecutions," that "reliance upon confessions generally has been minimized" and "the accumulation of other evidentiary material.., become standard operating procedure," 78 that the Washington, D.C., Police Department had testified that since Mallory was decided: (a) the District's solution rate had remained "nearly double" the national average; (b) indeed, the District's overall percentage of major crime solutions had increased; (c) specifically, the percentage had risen in cases of aggravated assault from 84.3 to 88; in robbery from 61.3 to 65; in housebreaking, from 50.5 to 54
In See Kamisar, supra note 49, at 184. Take another example. After wrestling with the problem for several years, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia dismissed the suggestion that the McNabb-Mallory rule affected the crime rate as "much too speculative."'" Indeed, the District's incidence of rapes, aggravated assaults, and grand larcency was lower in 1960 than in 1950. During this period, Maryland and Virginia had neither the McNabb-Mallory rule nor the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases; District law enforcement officers, of course, were "handcuffed" by both. Nevertheless, on a per 100,000 population basis, the District's overall felony rate increased a mere one per cent as against 69 per cent for the three Maryland and Virginia suburbs for which generally complete figures were available, and as against a nation-wide increase for the seven major offenses of 66 per cent.u2 How does Professor Inbae reply to all this?
As a result of the McNabb-Mallory rule, he informs us, "More criminals will remain at large, to commit other offenses. At the same time the deterrent effect of apprehension and conviction will be lost insofar as other potential offenders are concerned. The crime rate is bound to be greater under such circumstances, and I do not feel the need of statistics to support that conclusion."u3 Once again, Professor Inbau is unburdened by documentation and untroubled by the need to explain away the other fellow's.
Professor Inbau, it develops, need not deal with statistics or police-prosecution testimony because he has "simple logic" on his side. "[Slimple logic," he points out, "is available to support the proposition that the 
